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CASENOTE

A Sobering Ride Home:
Obremski v. Henderson
I.

INTRODUCTION

A woman and three children dressed in black peer down
at the camera in a new television commercial. There is no
narrator's voice, no explanations. The camera slowly descends
into a narrow and deep space, whose walls grow larger while
the family continues to look sorrowfully into the camera.
Suddenly, the viewers realize they are looking up at the family
from the bottom of a grave. A disembodied TV voice begins
talking about drinking and how to prevent your family from
1
looking down into a similar grave.
This powerful and melodramatic message is but one sign of the
nation's vibrant response in recent years to the destruction of life and
property caused by intoxicated drivers. 2 The response suggests a major
change in society's attitude toward alcohol. There is evidence that the
American public is re-examining its drinking practices and questioning
the nation's values and behaviors concerning the use, and abuse, of
alcohol.'

1. McNulty, Alcoholism Treatment Has Abuses Of Its Own, Chicago Tribune,
Nov. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 2. The author graphically describes a nationally televised
commercial which depicts the dangers of alcohol.
2. Intoxication has been defined as when "an individual does not have the
normal use of his physical or mental facilities, thus rendering him incapable of acting
in the manner in which an ordinary prudent and cautious man, in full possession of
his faculties, using reasonable care, would act under like circumstances." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 738 (5th ed. 1979).
For the purpose of this Note, a drunk driver may be defined as one who is
intoxicated to the extent that their blood-alcohol level is sufficient to warrant their
arrest in the jurisdiction where the accident occurred. Normally, a blood-alcohol
concentration (BAC) level of .10% is sufficient. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 9-111-7 (West Supp. 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 11-501 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 346.63 (West Supp. 1986).
3. A considerable amount of attention has been focused in recent years on
drunk driving. This is largely due to the efforts of such anti-drunk organizations as
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), Students Against Drunk Driving (SADD),
Citizens for Safe Drivers Against Drunk Driving (CSD), Remove Intoxicated Drivers
(RID), and Boost Alcohol Consciousness Concerning the Health of University
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It seems to happen every day of every year: hundreds of thousands of Americans drink alcoholic beverages and then slip behind
the wheel of a motor vehicle. Study after study has established the
direct correlation between driving while intoxicated and the occurrence
of traffic accidents, with resulting property damage and possible
personal injury or death to both the drunk driver and innocent
victims.4 Intoxicated drivers cause over fifty percent of all traffic

deaths, nearly 670,000 serious injuries and some 1,200,000 alcoholrelated property damage accidents each year.' As reported by the
Governor's Task Force to Reduce Drunk Driving, 223 Indiana citizens
died in alcohol-involved accidents in 1984, and more than 8,200
citizens were injured.6 This resulted in about 23 injuries each day.'

Students (BACCHUS). All of these groups are spokesmen for the "If you drink,
don't drive" message.
The issue of drunk driving received national attention in 1982 with the
establishment of the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving and the enactment
of legislation providing incentive grants to states "which adopt and implement
effective programs to reduce traffic safety problems resulting from persons driving
while under the influence of alcohol." (Added by Pub. L. No. 97-364, title I, §
101(a), Oct. 25, 1982, 96 Stat. 1738, current version at 23 U.S.C. § 408 (1985)). See
The New Hope of Solution: PresidentialCommission on Drunk Driving, Final Report

(Nov. 1985).
4. See Burg v. Municipal Court for Santa Clara Judicial District, 35 Cal. 3d
257, 673 P.2d 732, 198 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 967 (1984). The
court noted that the United States Department of Transportation reported traffic
deaths in the United States exceed 50,000 annually, and almost one-half of those
fatalities are alcohol-related. Burg, 673 P.2d at 734, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
See also Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 693 (1979). The court quoted the Secretary of the U.S. Depart. of Health,
Education and Welfare from the Third Special Report to the U.S. Congress on
Alcohol and Health (1978): "Traffic accidents are the greatest cause of violent death
in the United States, and approximately one-third of the ensuing injuries and onehalf of the fatalities are alcohol related." Taylor, 598 P.2d at 858, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
698.
As observed in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), "the increasing
slaughter on our highways, most of which should be avoidable, now reaches the
astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield." Id. at 439.

5. National Minimum Drinking Age: Hearings on S. 98-1155 Before the Subcomm. on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human

Resources, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 9-10 (1984) (testimony of Jim Burnett, Chairman,
Nat. Trans. Safety Bd., regarding the continuance of drunk driving despite increased

legislative and counter measure activity). See also Measures to Combat Drunk Driving:
Hearings on S. 98-917 Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transp. of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science and Transp., 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1984).
6. The Governor's Task Force to Reduce Drunk Driving: Indiana Drunk
Driving Fact Sheet (1985).

7. Id. These statistics have not gone unnoticed by the Indiana Supreme Court.
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As a result of the high incidence of alcohol-related automobile
collisions, many legislatures are taking greater steps to protect the
public.' Most commonly, these steps involve an increase in public
awareness programs, modification of law enforcement techniques to
facilitate the apprehension of drinking drivers, and increasingly severe
criminal sanctions against those convicted of driving while intoxicated. 9 In addition, a growing number of courts are now permitting
the recovery of exemplary damages in civil actions brought against
the intoxicated driver.'" It is the expansion of civil liability with
which this article deals.

In Williams v. Crist, 484 N.E.2d 576 (Ind. 1985), the court noted that the "drunken

driver is a major source of property damage and personal injury in the United States
today. The drunken driver kills more citizens each year than any other group of
criminals." Id. at 578.
8. Many states are reacting to the increase in alcohol-related automobile
accidents by increasing fines, lengthening sentences and revoking driver's licenses.
Winter, States Get Tougher on Drunk Drivers, 68 A.B.A. J. 140 (1982); Misner,
Severe Penalties for Driving Offenses: A Deterrence Analysis, 1975 AIZ. ST. L.J.
677.

9. See generally The New Hope of Solution: Presidential Commission on

Drunk Driving, Final Report (Nov. 1983). Recommendations include: programs to

increase public awareness of the danger of drunk driving; increased training of police
and prosecutors; use of roadblocks; elimination of plea bargaining; mandatory

sentencing; and increased availability of rehabilitation programs.
As an example of increased criminal sanctions, the Indiana legislature enacted
reform measures that became effective in September of 1983:
Operating a vehicle while intoxicated is now a Class A misdemeanor, bringing
a penalty of up to one year and a fine of up to $5000. Previously, the penalty was
five days to six months, and/or a fine of $25 to $500. IND. CODE ANN. § 9-11-2-2
(West Supp. 1986), as added by Pub. L. No. 143-1983, § 1; IND. CODE ANN. § 3550-3-2 (West 1986).
A repeat offender commits a Class D felony with a prison term of one to four
years and a fine of up to $10,000. Formerly, a second conviction resulted in a term
of five days to one year, and a fine of $250 to $1000. IND. CODE ANN. § 9-11-2-3
(West Supp. 1986), as added by Pub. L. No. 143-1983, § 1; IND. CODE ANN. § 355-2-7 (West 1986).
10. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 238 (1965). See also Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 656
(1975). See e.g., Illinois: Madison v. Wigal, 18 Ill. App. 564, 153 N.E.2d 90
(1958) (the assessment of punitive damages against an intoxicated driver is proper);
Iowa: Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954) (exemplary damages
were awarded when defendant drove his automobile while intoxicated); Wisconsin:
Ayala v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 272 Wis. 629, 76 N.W.2d 563 (1956) (the
assessment of exemplary damages was allowed for gross negligence in driving while
intoxicated).
"Exemplary" and "punitive" are terms most commonly applied to this class
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This Note will discuss the development of exemplary damages by
focusing on the Indiana decision of Obremski v. Henderson," which
for the first time extended the award of treble damages and attorney
fees against an intoxicated driver who caused property damage in an
automobile collision.' 2 The majority's decision in Obremski has, in
recognizing the similar aims of the criminal mischief and civil recovery
statutes, made it more practical to bring civil suits for moderate
property damage claims., 3
II.

HISTORY OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

Exemplary damages are money damages awarded in civil actions
beyond what is needed to compensate the plaintiff for the harm
inflicted by the defendant.14 The concept originated under English
law, not as a separate and recognized element of damage, but rather
as an attempt by English courts to justify jury money awards in excess
of the plaintiff's actual loss.' 5 Exemplary damages were later used
when damages awarded in tort at common law became restricted to
the pecuniary loss and did not include such elements as mental
suffering, injury to reputation, and humiliation. 16
In the early case of Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co.,1 7 the
plaintiff sought damages for mental anguish suffered when the telegraph company failed to deliver a message as to a family death. In
of money damages in excess of the plaintiff's actual loss. Throughout this Note,
these damages will be referred to as exemplary damages.
Exemplary damages are distinguished from compensatory damages in that an
award of the latter is merely intended to make the plaintiff whole, replacing the loss
caused by the wrong or injury. Exemplary damages transcend actual damages and
are inflicted not because of any special merit in the injured party's case, but rather
to punish the defendant and to make an example for similar wrongdoers. See W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (5th ed. 1984).
11. 487 N.E.2d 827 (Ind. App.), aff'd, 497 N.E.2d 909 (Ind. 1986).
12. Obremski v. Henderson, 497 N.E.2d 909, 911.
13. Auto Accidents: Drunk Driving, 29 ATLA L. REP. 441 (Dec. 1986).
14. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517
518-19 (1967).
15. Id. The case generally cited as establishing the theory of exemplary damages
is Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763). In Huckle, Lord Camden upheld
a large money jury award despite the fact that plaintiff's actual damages were only
slight. The court reasoned that the defendant's onerous conduct gave the jury ample
justification to award exemplary damages. Id. at 769.
16. See Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 15 (1982); Note, Punitive Damages for Crime Victims: New
Possibilities for Recovery in Indiana, 18 IND. L. REV. 655, 655 (1985).
17. 66 Tex. 580, 18 S.W. 351 (1855).
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holding that the injury was compensable, the court stated that the

consistent failure to recognize that such injuries as mental anguish
could enter into an assessment of compensatory damages, has forced
the creation of a new source of damages for these injuries - the
doctrine of exemplary damages.' 8

During the 19th century, there was a shift in the underlying

theory of exemplary damages from compensation to punishment and
deterrence. 19 A majority of the states now impose exemplary damages
with the intent of punishing the wrongdoer. 20 Commentators, however,
have expressed doubts as to the appropriateness of using exemplary
damages in this manner. 2' Exemplary damages, as a form of punish-

ment, have been challenged as an effective imposition of double

jeopardy. 22 Indiana sustained this argument and refused to award
exemplary damages when the defendant was also subject to criminal

sanctions .23

Thereafter, Indiana carved out various exceptions to this theory.
Initially, exemplary damages were allowed in a civil action provided

the statute of limitations had run as to any criminal prosecution

arising out of the same conduct. 24 Indiana later enacted a treble
damage statute which provided that a person, suffering a pecuniary
loss occasioned by a violation of specific criminal statutes, could bring
Id. at 580, 18 S.W. at 351. See also Reese v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
294, 24 N.E. 163 (1890).
Ellis, supra note 16, at 3.
See supra note 10.
See, e.g., Note, Insurance for Punitive Damages: A Reevaluation, 28
HASTINGS L.J. 431, 434 (1976). The author states that the award of exemplary
damages is "contrary to the purposes of civil law, which is intended to be compensatory, as distinct from criminal law, in which punishment is a traditional function."
22. As early as 1851, the doctrine of punitive damages was challenged unsuccessfully as unconstitutional. See Day v. Worth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 370-71
(1851). Since such damages serve a purpose so similar to that of the criminal law,
that of punishment, it has been argued that the civil defendant, facing possible
exemplary damages, should be granted the procedural due process guarantees afforded
one accused on criminal conduct.
23. Tabor v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322 (1854); Koerner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284 (1877);
In 1978, the court in Glissman v. Kutt, 175 Ind. App. 493, 372 N.E.2d 1188 (1978),
reaffirmed the rule first announced by the Indiana Supreme Court in Taber. The
court found that it would be "contrary to the basic concerns of punitive damages
... [to] permit both criminal prosecution and the sanction of punitive damages
where the defendant's conduct merely exhibits a 'heedless disregard of the consequences' to his victim." Glissman, 372 N.E.2d at 1191.
24. Cohen v. Peoples, 140 Ind. App. 353, 220 N.E.2d 665 (1966) (where
punitive damages were allowed providing the statute of limitations had run on the
assault and battery charge).
18.
193 Ind.
19.
20.
21.
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a claim for an amount equal to three times his actual damages. 25 Then
in 1984, Indiana enacted a new recovery statute, reversing a long

standing precedent that a defendant subject to criminal prosecution

could not be subject to a punitive damages suit.2 6 The Indiana

legislature's decision to allow the recovery of punitive damages, a
position taken by a prevailing number of states, 27 will increase the
plaintiffs' opportunities for the recovery of damages.2" Plaintiffs now
have a choice between a claim for punitive or treble damages.
The operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily intoxicated
presents a good example of the type of conduct for which exemplary
damages would be awarded: "Conduct which the defendant knows,
or should have reason to know, not only creates an unreasonable risk
of harm but a strong probability that the harm will result, yet as to
which the defendant proceeds in reckless or conscious disregard of

the consequences.' '29
Some jurisdictions view driving while intoxicated as sufficient in
itself to warrant the imposition of exemplary damages. 0 An emphasis
is placed on the fact that the defendant knew, or should have known,
that his consumption of alcohol would seriously effect his ability to
drive, and that this impaired ability would pose a danger to those
persons the defendant would encounter on the highway.31 Thus, the
25. See infra note 36. An amount "equal to" has been amended to read an
amount "not to exceed" three times the actual damages (Act of Feb. 29, 1984, Pub.
L. No. 172 § 1, 1984 Ind. Acts 1462, amending IND. CODE § 34-4-30-1 (1982)).
26. Act of Feb. 29, 1984, Pub. L. No. 172, § 1, 1984 Ind. Acts 1462 (codified

at

IND. CODE ANN.

§ 34-4-30-2 (West Supp. 1986)):

It is not a defense to an action for punitive damages that the defendant
is subject to criminal prosecution for the act or omission that gave rise to
the civil action. However, a person may not recover both:
(1) punitive damages; and
(2) the amounts provided for under [treble damages,] section 1 of this
chapter.
27. See Note, Punitive Damages in Drunk Driving Cases: A Call for a Strict
Standard and Legislative Action, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 607, 615-16 (Fall 1985)
(citing cases from 32 states); See also supra note 10.
28. See Note, Punitive Damages for Crime Victims: New Possibilities for
Recovery in Indiana, 18 IND. L. REV. 655, 656 (1985).
29. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE § 5.03, at
15 (1986).
30. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 10, § 2, at 9-10.
31. See, e.g., Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598
P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979) (where defendants display a conscious disregard
for safety of others when they voluntarily consume alcohol to the point of intoxication
knowing they will be driving); Ingram v. Pepit, 340 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1976) (where
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defendant's choice to drink to the point of intoxication, knowing he
must later operate a motor vehicle, is viewed as sufficiently reckless
conduct to justify the award of exemplary damages.
Other jurisdictions, however, have held that the mere proof that
the defendant operated a motor vehicle after voluntary intoxication,
standing alone, would not justify the imposition of exemplary damages.12 Evidence of intoxication may be offered to show the negligence
of the driver, but in the absence of other evidence justifying the
award of exemplary damages, it may not be used to enlarge the award
33
of damages beyond that necessary to compensate the plaintiff.
One principal use of exemplary damages has been for the punish34
ment of wrongs that would otherwise rarely be prosecuted. Exemplary damages are well suited for those wrongs which are theoretically
punishable, but which actually go unnoticed or are ignored by pros5
ecutors preoccupied with more serious or lucrative claims. The
has provided
Indiana legislature, in enacting Ind. Code § 34-4-30-1,
36
cases.
damage
nominal
an incentive to bring suit in
individuals who voluntarily drive while intoxicated display, without more, a sufficiently reckless attitude); Allers v. Willis, 197 Mont. 499, 643 P.2d 592 (1982) (where
individuals who voluntarily drink to a point of intoxication knowing they will be
driving are liable for punitive damages); Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487
P.2d 167 (1971) (where intoxication alone is sufficient to find willful and wanton
conduct).
32. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 10, § 2, at 9-10.
33. See, e.g., Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 114 S.E.2d 617 (1960) (where
absent proof of misconduct, other than just intoxication, exemplary damages will
not be awarded); Ayala v. Farmer's Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 272 Wis. 629, 76 N.W. 2d
563 (1956) (where intoxication alone does not constitute gross negligence); Focht v.
Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970) (where driving while intoxicated
may under certain circumstances be deemed outrageous); Harrel v. Ames, 265 Or.
183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973) (where driving while under the influence is not by itself a
sufficient basis for exemplary damages).
34. While it may be argued that the large compensatory awards that many
drunk drivers may be held liable for a sufficient incentive alone, there could be
instances where actual damages are minimal, and in those instances exemplary
damages would prove a viable incentive. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 10,
§ 2, at 11-12.
35. Id. See also Comment, Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver, 8
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 117, 129 (1980).
36. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-30-1 (West Supp. 1986). The statute provides that:
If a person suffers a pecuniary loss as a result of a violation of I.C. § 3543 [§§ 35-43-1-1 to 35-43-5-5] he may bring a civil action against the person
who caused the loss for:
(1) An amount not to exceed three (3) times his actual damages;
(2) The cost of the action; and

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

Until recently, property damage as a result of drunk driving was

not as diligently prosecuted as accidents involving serious injury or
death. a7 However, Obremski v. Henderson38 should now provide a
would-be plaintiff with an incentive to bring suit for the recovery of
only nominal property damage. What was once an insignificant
accident may now result in serious financial punishment to a drunk

driver.

III.
A.

OBREMSKI v. HENDERSON

FACTS OF THE CASE

The plaintiff, Russell Obremski, brought this action against the
defendant, Charles Henderson, seeking to recover for property damage alleged to have resulted from an automobile accident.3 9 The
plaintiff charged that the collision, and the resulting damage to his
car, was the proximate result of the defendant's negligence and
carelessness, and, in addition, alleged the extreme intoxication of the

defendant .4

Obremski was driving his car on the evening of April 14, 1983,
in the city of New Albany, Indiana, when he observed the Henderson
car traveling toward him in his lane. 41 Obremski reportedly blew his

horn several times and proceeded to stop. 42 The Henderson car failed
to stop or return to its own lane and the resulting collision caused
damages of approximately $2,900.00 to Obremski's car. 43 At the time

(3) A reasonable attorney's fee.
See American Leasing, Inc. v. Maple. (Ind. App. 1980) (where a check was given in
payment of an account and the check was subsequently dishonored); Lemert Eng'g
Co. v. Monroe Auto Equip. Co., 444 N.E.2d 859 (Ind. App. 1983) (where a postdated
check was twice dishonored); McMahon Food Co. v. Call, 406 N.E. 2d 1206 (Ind.
App. 1980) (where court reversed the trial court's refusal to award treble damages
resulting from dishonored checks).
37. See generally Note, Punitive Damagesfrom Crime Victims: New Possibilities for Recovery in Indiana, 18 IND. L. REV. 655 (1985).
38. 487 N.E.2d 827 (Ind. App.), aff'd, 497 N.E.2d 909 (Ind. 1986).
39. Brief for Appellee at 3, Obremski v. Henderson, 487 N.E.2d 827 (Ind.
App.), aff'd, 497 N.E.2d 909 (Ind. 1986).
40. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 910.
41. Brief for Appellant at 7, Obremski v. Henderson, 487 N.E.2d 827 (Ind.
App.), aff'd, 497 N.E.2d 909 (Ind. 1986).
42. Id.
43. Brief for Appellee, supra note 39, at 3.
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of the accident, Henderson was reported to be intoxicated."4
Obremski's complaint alleged that the collision was caused by
Henderson's negligent driving while very intoxicated, and sought
damages for the estimated cost of repairs to his car. 45 Also, by reason
of Henderson's intoxication, Obremski asserted that he was entitled
to treble damages and attorney fees pursuant to § 34 of the Indiana
Code," on the grounds that Henderson's alleged acts constituted
47
criminal mischief.
The trial court granted Henderson's motion to dismiss the criminal mischief complaint, 48 for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.4 9 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
judgment, stating that proof of a driver's intoxication at the time of
a collision allows a trier of fact to infer that the driver was acting
"recklessly," thereby permitting the recovery of treble damages and
attorney fees.5 0 Henderson's petition for rehearing was denied." The
Indiana Supreme Court granted Henderson's petition to transfer the
cause for review as a certified question. 2
B.

ANALYSIS

1. Obremski I: Indiana Court of Appeals
Before entering into an analysis of the Indiana Supreme Court's
decision it is necessary to first discuss the holding of the state appellate
court. The Indiana Court of Appeals reasoned that proof of a driver's
intoxication at the time of the collision would allow the inference that
44. Police Report No. 18-18044, New Albany Police Depart., New Albany,
Indiana (Aug. 14, 1983).
It should be noted that the police report was not admissible into evidence. The
trial court struck certain language of the complaint which originally made reference
to statements in the police report regarding the intoxicated condition of the defendant.
45. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 910.
46. See supra note 36.
47. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-2(a)(1) (West 1986). Criminal mischief is committed when a person "recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damages property of
another without his consent."
48. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 910.
49. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(B)(6). The defendant did not amend his complaint as
of right pursuant to Trial Rule 12 (B), but instead waived his right to amend the
Order of Dismissal of count two so as to make the same a final appealable order
and judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P. 54(B).
50. Obremski, 487 N.E.2d at 828.
51. Id. at 827.
52. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 909.
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the driver was acting recklessly, and thereby permit the recovery of
treble damages caused by criminal mischief. 3 The Court of Appeals
concluded that driving while intoxicated is "reckless per se." '5 4 This
questionable approach is the result of the court's interpretation of the
decision in Williams v. Crist."
Williams v. Crist, an Indiana Supreme Court plurality opinion,
held that evidence of driving while intoxicated was sufficient to
establish willful and wanton misconduct per se.16 The plurality opinion
of the five justice court overruled prior precedent which held that

before intoxication could be characterized as willful and wanton
conduct under the guest statute, it must be accompanied with some
other misconduct. 7 The concurring opinion, however, written by
Justice Shepard in which Justice DeBruler concurred, established the
same result based upon sufficient evidence of misconduct and stated
that it would not overrule the prior authorities. 8 Justice Prentice

53. Obremski, 487 N.E.2d at 828.
54. Id. at 830.
55. 484 N.E.2d 576 (Ind. 1985). The facts of Williams indicate that Williams,
the driver, had recently consumed five beers, a shot of bourbon and a mixed drink.
While driving on a busy street, he made a wrong turn. Williams chose to correct his
mistake by recrossing the highway, however he did not stop at the intersection. The
resulting collision caused personal injuries to one of his passengers. A personal injury
action was brought under the Indiana guest statute. Williams, 484 N.E.2d at 577.
56. Williams, 484 N.E.2d at 578.
57. Roberts v. Chaney, 465 N.E.2d 1154 (Ind. App. 1984). In Roberts the facts
indicated no willful and wanton misconduct on the part of the driver, who drove off
the road after falling asleep, striking a utility pole and injuring a passenger. Although
Chaney had been drinking there was no evidence showing intoxication. The court
stated that even if there had been evidence of intoxication, in the absence of any
evidence of abnormal behavior by the driver either before or after the accident, or
of evidence of excessive speed or unusual driving maneuvers, there was no willful
and wanton misconduct. Roberts, 465 N.E.2d at 1155.
See also Andert v. Fuchs, 271 Ind. 627, 394 N.E.2d 931 (1979). The court, in
Andert, held that although the motorist was driving on a snowy night while intoxicated, he was driving at a reduced speed and obeying all traffic laws. The fact that
the accident occurred when the vehicle unexpectedly went out of control demonstrated
that he was not guilty of the wanton and willful conduct required for recovery under
the guest statute. Andert, 394 N.E.2d at 932.
In Keck v. Kerbs, 182 Ind. App. 530, 395 N.E.2d 845 (1979), the court used a
combination of factors to possibly indicate wanton and willful misconduct. Evidence
of alcohol consumption shortly before the accident, under-age drinking, excessive
speed, and the police officer's observations at the scene of the 'accident were
sufficient to raise at least a factual question as to wanton misconduct. Keck, 395
N.E.2d at 846.
58. Williams, 484 N.E.2d at 579.
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dissented as to the result, as well as to the overruling of prior
precedent . 9
The Court of Appeals in Obremski I recognized the questionable
precedential value of Williams, but nevertheless chose to follow the
ideals expressed by the plurality opinion. 6° The appeals court found
that there was no difference between the definition of willful and
wanton conduct and reckless conduct; both willful and wanton behavior and reckless behavior imply the same disregard for the safety
of another. 61 Therefore, relying upon Williams, the appeals court in
intoxicated is willful and
Obremski I concluded that "if driving while
62
se."
per
reckless
also
is
it
se,
per
wanton
2.

Obremski II: Indiana Supreme Court

The essential question posed to the Indiana Supreme Court was
whether an intoxicated driver, who causes a collision as a result of
deficient driving, could be held liable through his reckless conduct
for treble damages and attorney fees. 63 The majority answered this
question affirmatively, holding that a case of criminal mischief could
be made out by proof that the collision and the resulting property64
damage was caused by the reckless driving of an intoxicated driver.
The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the reversal of the trial court's
dismissal of the criminal mischief complaint, but declined to follow
the Indiana Court of Appeals' reasoning, 65instead finding that driving
while intoxicated was not reckless per se.
The Indiana Supreme Court began its analysis of Obremski II by
examining the special legislative provisions allowing civil action recovery of property loss caused by a criminal act. 66 Among the offenses
which would fall into this category is criminal mischief. 67 Criminal
mischief is committed when a person "recklessly, knowingly,'6 or
intentionally damages property of another without his consent."

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
35-43-1-1

67.

Id.
Obremski, 487 N.E.2d at 831.
Id. at 830.
Id.
Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 909-10.
Id. at 910.
Id.
Id. at 909. Liability is imposed for a violation of
to 35-43-5-5].
IND. CODE ANN.

68. Id.

§ 35-43-1-2 (West 1986).

IND. CODE

§ 35-43 [§§
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The Obremski II court concentrated its discussion of culpability
upon reckless conduct. 69 The code defines reckless in a general manner,

stating that: "A person engages in conduct 'recklessly' if he engages
in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm
that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation
from acceptable standards of conduct." 70 The defendant argued that
the acts stated in the reckless driving statute were the exclusive

enumeration of acts which would constitute reckless conduct in the
operation of a motor vehicle in Indiana. 7' The defendant claimed that
the code defined in a specific, detailed manner those acts which would
subject a motorist to liability based upon his reckless behavior in the
operation of a vehicle.72
The Indiana Supreme Court did not agree with the defendant's

argument. Rather, the court chose to use the more general code
definition of reckless.73 The effect being not to limit the manner in
which reckless conduct may be committed through the use of a motor

69. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 910.
70. IND, CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-2(c) (West 1986). Various parts of the Indiana
Code "impose criminal responsibility upon one who acts 'recklessly'." Slusher v.
State, 437 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ind. App. 1982).
71. See IND. CODE ANN. § 9-4-1-56.1 (West Supp. 1986). One such portion of
the Indiana Code is the reckless driving statute which reads:
A person operating a vehicle who recklessly:
(1) drives at such an unreasonably high rate of speed, or at such
an unreasonably low rate of speed, under the circumstances, as to
endanger the safety of the property of others, or as to block the
proper flow of traffic;
(2) passes another vehicle from the rear while on a slope or on a
curve where vision is obstructed for a distance of less than five
hundred (500) feet ahead;
(3) drives in and out of a line of traffic, except as otherwise
permitted; or
(4) speeds up or refuses to give one-half (1/2) of the roadway to a
driver overtaking or desiring to pass;
Commits a class B misdemeanor; and, if the offense results in damage to
the property of another person, the court shall recommend the suspension
of the current driving license of the person for a fixed period of not less
than thirty (30) days nor more than one (1) year.
72. Brief for Appellee, supra note 39, at 4. The defendant argued that the acts
enumerated in the reckless driving statute were the exclusive recital of acts which
would constitute reckless conduct in the operation of a motor vehicle in Indiana.The
defendant did not argue that the reckless driving statute supplanted the general
definition of recklessness, but rather that it specifically defined the term within the
context of motor vehicle use.
73. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 910.

1987:279]

TREBLE DAMAGE LIABILITY FOR DRUNK DRIVERS

will be left to
vehicle. The decision of determining reckless conduct
74
basis.
case-by-case
a
on
considered
be
to
jury,
the
The concept of reckless conduct that the court chose to apply,
however, is not so easily understood. What must be proven is that
the defendant consciously disregarded the acceptable standard of
conduct and the harm which might occur; 75 essentially, that the driver
must have disregarded the obligation to drive with the due care and
attention expected of him. 76 The concept may be considered as follows:
Reckless driving is distinguishable from driving without
due care and attention. A person doing his incompetent best
may be guilty of driving without due care and attention but
he cannot be guilty of reckless driving. Doing one's best is
incompatible with a deliberate disregard of the obligation to
77
drive with due care.
A driver cannot be guilty of reckless driving when he is not
consciously disregarding his obligation to drive carefully. This would
be true of a person who drives dangerously as the result of a mistake7
of fact, such as driving in the wrong direction on a one-way street. 1
On the other hand, if the driver consciously departs from the acceptable standard of driving required by statute, it would be no defense
to the charge that he did not consider himself to be taking an undue79
risk, and that he was confident in his ability to avoid an accident.
The obligation to drive within the acceptable standards of conduct is
an objective standard. 0 If one drives in the dark without the use of
lights, there is little doubt that he would be guilty of reckless conduct
74. Id. at 911.
75. Id. One is reckless or in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of
others when he or she performs an act or fails to perform an act which he or she
knows or has reason to know will. unreasonably increase the risk of physical harm to

another.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 501 (1977); W. Prosser & W. Keeton,

supra note 10, § 34, at 213.
76. The standard of care required of an intoxicated driver is that of a reasonably
prudent sober person. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1977); W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON, supra note 10, § 32, at 178.
77. Comment, Road Traffic, CRIM. L. R. 309, 311 (1980).
78. Stauffer v. Lothamer, 419 N.E.2d 203 (Ind. App. 1981) (where an error in
judgment or mistake in fact, standing alone, will not amount to wanton and willful
misconduct).
79. See Road Traffic, supra note 77.
80. The court directs attention to the quality of the driving in fact, and all that
is in issue is the degree to which the driver in question fell below the standard to be
expected of a careful and competent driver in all the circumstances of the particular
case. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 910.
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in a conscious departure from the standard required of all drivers."s
The majority felt that to sustain liability, "a plaintiff must
establish that the defendant's behavior fell below some established
norm, and that this behavior was the proximate cause of the damage
which occurred. ' a2 The court held that intoxication, in and of itself,
cannot be the "reckless" cause of a collision. 3 If a driver's behavior
on the road meets every norm and established standard of conduct,
he will not be held liable for damages, for there is no breach of duty,
and nothing in his behavior has been the proximate cause of the
collision.14 However, if a drunk driver falls below the acceptable
standard of conduct for a competent motorist, and his breach was
the cause in fact of the damage, 5 a jury might very well find reckless
conduct and has done S0.86
81. Barry v. Tyler, 171 Va. 381, 199 S.E. 496 (1938). The court, in Barry,
found that the failure to have the headlights of the automobile burning was sufficient
to charge the operator of the automobile with negligence, if such failure has a causal
connection with the injury.
It should be noted, however, that the court in Morgan v. Southern Farm
Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 223 F. Supp. 996 (1963), aff'd, 339 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1964),
found that the failure to display proper lights upon a vehicle driven by the plaintiff
would not bar recovery, if the streets were well lit or for some other reason the
absence of lights on the plaintiff's vehicle was not the proximate cause of the
accident.
82. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 910. "[I]ntoxication is not negligence in itself,
and it must be shown to have caused the actor's behavior to have deviated from that
of a reasonable person and to have caused the plaintiff's injury." W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON supra note 10, § 32 at 178-79.
83. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 910. See Focht at Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35,
268 A.2d 157 (1970). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Focht, indicated some
concern that evidence of intoxication alone would allow liability to be imposed. The
court stated that "driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor with its
very great potential for harm and serious injury may under certain circumstances be
deemed 'outrageous conduct' and a 'reckless indifference to the interest of others'
sufficient to allow the imposition of punitive damages." Therefore, this court also
recognized that despite the defendant's intoxication, circumstances would have to be
present which would warrant an exemplary award. Focht, 268 A.2d at 160 (emphasis
added); See also Hubble v. Brown, 227 Ind. 202, 84 N.E.2d 891 (1949) (where
intoxication by itself may not be sufficient to warrant the conclusion of gross
negligence or willful or wanton misconduct); DeVaney v. State, 259 Ind. 483, 288
N.E.2d 732 (1972) (where evidence of intoxication may be considered, but alone is
not sufficient to constitute reckless conduct).
84. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 910. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 10, § 40 at 263 (providing a general discussion of proximate cause).
85. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 910; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON supra note 10, §
40 at 264.
86. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 911. See Smith v. Chapman, 115 Ariz. 211, 564
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Obremski H directs attention to the quality of driving in fact,
and not to the state of mind or intention of the driver.17 All that is
at issue and all that is required of the jury is to determine the degree
to which the driver has fallen below the standard expected of a careful
and competent driver. 88 If the conduct is characterized by recklessness,
it would constitute gross negligence, while ordinary negligence would
be characterized by want of ordinary care.8 9 The jury must consider
all the circumstances of the particular case and determine whether the
conduct should be labeled reckless or merely negligent. 9° Once decided,
the jury must then decide the issue of causation.
The Obremski H decision seems to suggest two possible avenues
the court's decision could have taken regarding the issue of causa-

tion. 9' If the Indiana Supreme Court had intended that the presence
of intoxication alone justified exemplary damages, then the traditional
tort requirement of proximate cause would be discarded. 92 The Court

P.2d 900 (1977) (where seriously intoxicated and driving without headlights); Miller
v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948) (where intoxicated and driving on
the wrong side of the road); Infeld v. Sullivan, 151 Conn. 506 199 A.2d 693 (1964)
(where intoxicated, driving on the wrong side of the road, speeding, and swerving);
Pratt v. Duck, 28 Tenn. App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 (1945) (where grossly drunk and
vehicle zigzagging on the highway).
87. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 911.
88. Id. at 910. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON supra note 10, § 45 at 320-21
(providing a general discussion of the function of the jury).
89. Ayala v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 272 Wis. 629, 76 N.W.2d 563, 568
(1956).
90. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 910-11.
91. Id. at 910-12.

92. A few jurisdictions presently allow the imposition of exemplary damages
against drunk drivers upon proof of intoxication alone. The Florida decision of
Ingram v. Pepit, 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976), best exemplifies this stance. The facts
of the case indicate that Ingram's car was sitting in a well-lit intersection when it was
hit from the rear by Pepit. Pepit's car had not been moving at an excessive rate of
speed, or seen to swerve or veer outside the lane of traffic. In fact, except for
conflicting evidence as to whether Pepit applied his brakes before his vehicle struck
Ingram's, there was no indication that the operation of Pepit's car up to the time of
the accident was other than normal. Id. at 923.
The court held that an intoxicated driver could be held liable for exemplary

damages:
[Wlithout regard to external proof of recklessness or abnormal driving ...
[w]e affirmatively hold that the voluntary act of driving 'while intoxicated'
evinces, without more a sufficiently reckless attitude for a jury to be asked
to provide an award of punitive damages if it determines liability exists for
compensatory damages.
Id. at 924 (emphasis added). Justice Sunberg, in his dissent, stated "I suggest that
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of Appeals decision that intoxication is "reckless per se" would have
been applied. Seemingly, the jury could assess exemplary damages
simply because the defendant happened to be intoxicated. Causation
would automatically be imputed to the intoxication of a driver who
is involved in an accident in that condition. 93
The Indiana Supreme Court, however, did not follow the reasoning of the Court of Appeals. Instead, the court required a showing
that the defendant's intoxicated behavior was the proximate cause of the
damage which occurred. 94 It will be essential to establish a causal
connection between the defendant's intoxication and the accident. 95
This will not necessarily be as easy to accomplish as may appear at
first glance. It would be possible for a drunk driver to cause an
accident in such a manner as to not indicate intoxication.96 For
example, a drunk driver could be well within the speed limit, drive a
straight line and still have a rear-end collision with a car stopped at
an intersection. Rear-end collisions are very common and mostly due
to inattention and not intoxication. In such a situation, under Obremski II, it is unlikely one could get exemplary damages and it is
arguable that one should not. 97
Obremski II requires a showing that the defendant's intoxication
caused the accident. 98 Intoxication as proximate cause seems to play
a "substantial factor" in the evaluation of the circumstances. 99 Reckless conduct will be imposed only after establishing that the defendant's intoxication was a substantial factor in the cause of the accident.l°0
It will be essential for the plaintiff to present a prima facia case,
showing a causal connection between the defendant's intoxication and

the law of torts as it has carefully developed over the years permits an award of
punitive damages in personal injury cases involving vehicles where reckless conduct
is involved, not reckless attitude." Id. at 927 (emphasis added).
93. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 10, § 36 at 229-30.
94. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 911.
95. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 10, § 41 at 269.
96. See Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 114 S.E.2d 617 (1960) (where evidence
showed a typical rear-end collision as a result of simple lack of ordinary care and
caution).
97. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 910.
98. Id.
99. The "conduct is a cause of the event if it was a material element and a
substantial factor in bringing it about. Whether it was such a substantial factor is for
the jury to determine, unless the issue is so clear that reasonable persons could not
differ." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 10, § 41 at 267-68.
100. Id.
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the accident. 10 ' This will play a prominent role in those rare instances
when a defendant's intoxication has a nominal, or completely immaterial, impact on the causation of the accident.
The Indiana Supreme Court in Obremski Istated that the jury,
02
in reaching a conclusion, should consider the whole of the situation.1

The jury should consider the decision to drive while intoxicated, along
with the acts of driving which are alleged to be the proximate cause
of the collision. 03 The majority felt that the decision to drive in an
intoxicated state would certainly "involve a substantial deviation from
acceptable standards of conduct." °4 But, the court emphasized the
examination of the whole of the defendant's behavior in determining
reckless conduct rather than the mere fact of intoxication.0 5 Evidence
of intoxication should be used as an element to prove the driver's
misconduct rather than intoxication being the only element of the
driver's misconduct.
The opinion concluded by addressing the appropriate standard
of proof necessary to establish the plaintiff's right to recover treble
damages. 01 6 Judge Ratliff pointed out in his concurring opinion in
Obremski I that the appropriate standard of proof is a preponderance
of the evidence, and not clear and convincing evidence. 01 7 The majority
in Obremski II agreed with Judge Ratliff's opinion, finding that where

101. In Ayala v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Wis. 629, 76 N.W.2d 563 (1956),
the Wisconsin Supreme Court analyzed the balance that must be struck between
evidence of intoxication and proof that such intoxication had a causal effect in
producing a certain accident.
Intoxication, standing by itself does not constitute either gross negligence
or ordinary negligence. While a person's driving of a motor vehicle when
intoxicated, is prohibited by statute, and is a criminal offense, nevertheless,
an intoxicated driver of a motor vehicle may become involved in a collision
and yet be free from negligence, and therefore, not liable to respond in
damages ... However, when there is concurrence of intoxication and causal
negligence as to items such as speed, management and control, position on
the highway, lookout, etc., the same constitutes gross negligence.
Ayala, 76 N.W.2d at 570. According to this explanation, intoxication may become
the basis for exemplary damages only if the evidence of intoxication additionally
manifests itself circumstantially through the defendant's erratic or abnormal driving
and is the proximate cause of the injury.
102. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 911.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Obremski, 487 N.E.2d at 831.
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the statutory prerequisites of the code are established by a preponderance of the evidence, treble damages and attorney fees are appropriate. 081 The majority distinguished the recovery of punitive damages,
which requires a greater standard of proof at trial. 1°9
Although different in form from criminal penalties, the consequences of civil liability are still penal in nature." 0 Despite this
similarity in purpose, and the potential for a sizable exemplary award,
the defendant in a civil action for treble damages is not afforded the
same safeguards which accompany the criminal trial and protect the
criminal defendant."' In criminal courts, the state is required to
establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," 2 while in
civil action proceedings the plaintiff must prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence." 3 By changing the civil evidentiary rule to
require proof by clear and convincing evidence in a punitive damages
suit, the court has increased the plaintiff's burden of proof in accordance with the increase of possible consequences to the defendant. The
majority in Obremski II, however, declined to raise the standard of
proof required of the plaintiff in a treble damage suit."14 To effectuate
the recovery of treble damages and attorney fees, then it will only be
108. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 911. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-30-2 (West Supp.
1986). See e.g., Campins v. Capels, 461 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. App. 1984) (where civil
standard of review required proof of claim by a preponderance of the evidence);
James v. Brink & Erb, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 414 (Ind. App. 1983) (where a preponderance
of evidence, rather than reasonable doubt, standard applied in action to recover
treble damages).
109. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 911. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-34-1, -2 (West
Supp. 1986) which reads:
(1) This chapter applies to all cases in which a party requests the
recovery of punitive damages in a civil action.
(2) Before a person may recover punitive damages in any civil action,
that person must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, all of the facts
that are relied upon by that person to support his recovery of punitive
damages.
This higher standard of proof for punitive damages claims was first enunciated
in Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 1982), where the court
stated: "The stricter standard is utilized when fundamental rights are involved and
the legal and social ramifications of the civil proceeding are serious." Id. at 362.
110. See Note, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34
U. CHI. L. REV. 408, 409-12 (1976).
111. Id. Despite the similarity in purpose, the effects of civil and criminal
punishment are unequal. A exemplary damages award only invades the defendant's
pocketbook, whereas criminal penalties often include a loss of freedom, warranting
the protection of special procedural safeguards.
112. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 341, at 962 (3d ed. 1984).
113. Id. at 956.
114. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 911.
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necessary to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant acted in conscious disregard of the acceptable standard of
conduct, and the harm which might occur." 5
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The object of the Obremski II decision is to prevent the increasing
number of alcohol-related accidents on the public highways, and
thereby protect persons and property from injury. The decision to
impose liability on the intoxicated driver is a determination which will
force the driver to consider the potential costs to the victimized
motorist, and subsequently himself, if he chooses to drive under the
influence of alcohol. The imposition of exemplary damages for the
reckless acts of drunk drivers is intended to prevent victims from
going uncompensated for those damages, and to deter the consumption of excessive amounts of alcohol by those persons who know they
must later drive.
The Obremski H court chose to focus primarily on whether the
totality of the defendant's conduct proved to be reckless." '6 It will be
necessary to determine if the conduct of the defendant was negligent
to such a degree so as to pose a high risk of harm to the foreseeable
plaintiff; whether the lack of care was greater than that of ordinary
negligence, and rose to the level of reckless conduct. 17 The intoxication of the driver will be one of the factors tending to prove recklessness, a finding of which is necessary to the imposition of criminal
mischief and the recovery of treble damages." '
In effect, the court's decision will lead to a logical sequence of
causation. Proof that the intoxication impaired the senses; the impaired senses led to irregular and dangerous driving; and the irregular
and dangerous driving was the cause of the collision. This fundamentally sound logic will achieve two distinct objectives. First, it will
force the plaintiff to present a prima facie case, which may or may
not be easily accomplished.' 9 Second, it serves to protect drunk drivers
in those cases where they are innocent of any causal effect to the
collision.' 20 This will prevent the drunk driver from being strictly liable
115. Id.
116. Id. at 910-11.
117. Id. See also Ayala v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 272 Wis. 629, 76
N.W.2d 563 (1956).
118. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 910-11.

119. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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for a collision and having exemplary damages imposed upon him,
simply because of intoxication.
Obremski II permits the imposition of exemplary damages upon
a showing of some form of reckless conduct. 2' Alcohol usage is only
one of the factors to be considered, and it is entirely possible that
exemplary damages could be awarded even though the defendant was
not intoxicated. 2 2 Otherwise, we could face the situation where two
plaintiffs with identical injuries, from identical automobile accidents
would be compensated differently. A plaintiff struck by an intoxicated
driver would be compensated with exemplary damages whereas plaintiff struck by a sober driver would not have exemplary damages
available as a remedy, regardless of the conduct of the defendant
driver. Also, under Obremski II, it would seem probable that damages, for not only property damages, but also personal injury damages
could be sought under the civil action treble damage statute.' 23 This
would allow the plaintiff who suffers extensive injuries as a result of
a defendant's reckless conduct and drunk driving to claim treble
damages for the "pecuniary loss" caused by the defendant's criminal
mischief.
While many factors can influence the jury's verdict, once it hears
the evidence of the defendant's intoxication, it will be difficult for
trial counsel to convince the jury that exemplary damages are not
appropriate. There may well be a highly prejudicial effect of revealing
to the jury that the defendant had been drinking. It will be difficult
for a jury to disassociate the fact of intoxication and items of
misconduct, such as speed, management and control, and position on
the highway. The concurrence of intoxication and causal negligence
as to the items of misconduct will often lead the jury to a determination of gross negligence, even when the intoxication is not an actual
cause of the injury.
The law of torts, however, does not permit such a sweeping
inference. Intoxication plus negligent driving does not equal reckless
conduct on the part of the defendant. 24 Such an inference would
eliminate the necessity of showing proximate cause. A driver, who
121. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 911.
122. See, e.g., Shirley v. Shirley, 261 Ala. 100, 73 So. 2d 77 (1954) (where
driving on a curving road at speed between 75 and 100 miles per hour supported an
award of exemplary damages); Wigginton's Adm'r v. Rickert, 186 Ky. 650, 217 S.W.
933 (1920) (where evidence of intoxication, but excessive speed would have justified
a finding of extreme misconduct and hence exemplary damages).
123. Auto Accidents: Drunk Driving, 29 ATLA L. REP. 441 (Dec. 1986).
124. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 910.
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has been drinking prior to driving, would be strictly liable for exemplary damages, whether or not the consumption of alcohol has
anything to do with the subsequent accident. To avoid this imposition
of strict liability, it will be necessary to require the plaintiff to prove
the traditional elements of the cause of action, such as proximate
125
cause and an underlying award of compensatory damages.
Several other practical considerations should be considered that
directly result from the decision in Obremski HI. Since there is no
independent basis for exemplary damages, it is necessary to determine
the actual damages sustained that are capable of being measured in
terms of compensatory damages. 2 6 To the extent that a plaintiff must
prove that he sustained actual harm or injury as a result of the
wrongful conduct of the defendant, the inability to provide that proof
would destroy the cause of action. 2 7 For without a finding of actual
damages there is no cause of action at all, and nothing to support
the exemplary award. The plaintiff must have sustained at least some
nominal harm, capable of being measured in terms of compensatory

damages. 128

It will also be necessary for the plaintiff to make a choice of
whether to bring a punitive or treble damage claim. There would seem
to be nothing to prohibit a request for treble damages, or alternatively
punitive damages, with demand for recovery being the greater of the
two. 2 9 If the plaintiff chooses one form of relief over the other prior
to final adjudication, certain factors should weigh in the selection. In
certain cases, the recovery of treble damages will be less advantageous
than a punitive damages award. 30 For example, in a suit where the
125. Ingram v. Petit, 340 So. 2d 922, 924 (Fla. 1976).
126. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 10, § 2, at 14-15.
127. Id. See Baker v. American States Ins. Co., 428 N.E.2d 1342 (Ind. App.
1981) (where compensatory damages were a prerequisite); Newton v. Yates, 170 Ind.
App. 486, 353 N.E.2d 485 (1976) (where nominal damages were a prerequisite).
128. See, e.g., Reynold v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 223
F.2d 429 (2nd Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (where nominal damages
supported $175,000 in punitive damages); Edwards v. Nulsen, 347 Mo. 1077, 152
S.W.2d 28 (1941) (where the court awarded $1 actual and $25,000 punitive damages).
129. IND. R. TR. P. (8)A provides:
(A) Claimsfor relief. To state a claim for relief, whether an original claim,
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, a pleading must contain:
(1) A short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and
(2) A demand for the relief to which he deems himself entitled.
Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be
demanded.
130. See, e.g., Price v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 530 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App.
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actual damages sustained are of minimal value, relief in the form of
treble damages may be much lower than would a punitive damage
award, as would be the punishment and deterrent value of the award
which is designed to keep the defendant from repeating the same
misconduct in the future. The plaintiff must also consider the difference in the burden of proof requirements under the treble and punitive
damage claims. 13I The punitive damage action will require a standard
of clear and convincing proof,3 2 while the treble damage suit will
only require the plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance of the
evidence.'
This difference in the standard of proof may play a
substantial part in the plaintiff's choice of claims.
Despite the potential for awards of treble damages and attorney
fees under Obremski II, the biggest obstacle to the effectiveness of
the decision may be the insolvency, or limited financial resources, of
the majority of defendants who commit the criminal acts. 3 4 Winning
the civil suit is only the first step; the difficulty lies in enforcing the
judgement. Although the plaintiffs may now recover treble damages
for conduct that is both tortious and criminal, the defendants in civil
actions may very well be penniless. 35 The question for many plaintiffs
will then be the ability to recover their awards from the defendants'
insurance companies.
There is a split among jurisdictions regarding the issue of whether
a tort-feasor can insure against exemplary damage liability. 3 6 Jurisdictions prohibiting insurance coverage for exemplary damages have
done so with the view that exemplary damages are for punishment
and deterrence, and that those purposes would be lost if a defendant
were allowed to shift the burden to his insurance carrier.131 Other
1975) (where court assessed $25,000 .in punitive damages with only $600 in actual
damages; the treble damage award would have been a fraction of the punitive relief
actually given); Malco, Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, Inc., 14 Wis. 2d 57, 109
N.W.2d 516 (1961) (where court found no arbitrary rule that punitive damages cannot
be 15 times actual damages).

131. See Note, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34

U. CHI. L. REv. 408, 409-12 (1976).
132. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-30-2 (West Supp. 1986).
133. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-34-2 (West Supp. 1986).
134. Kiesel, Crime and Punishment, 70 A.B.A. J. 25-28 (Jan. 1984).
135. Id.
136. For a general analysis of the issue of insurability of exemplary damages, see
J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 29, at § 2.03; Young, Insurability of Punitive
Damages: A Revolution, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (1976).
137. The leading case prohibiting insurance coverage for exemplary damages is
Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). This drunk
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jurisdictions permit insurance for exemplary damages on the theory
that to prohibit insurability would not deter drivers from wrongful
conduct in view of the fact that there are already a large number of
criminal sanctions attached to such behavior, and sanctions have little
38
deterrent effect.
Essentially, there is little question that the insurer will defend the
civil drunk driver case. 1 39 However, it would be advisable for the
plaintiff to not only bring a claim for exemplary damages, but also
to plead a cause of action for simple negligence. This will guard
against dismissal if the jury finds that the defendant's conduct did
not constitute anything more than negligence. Also, it should help to
avoid the problem of an insurer initially seizing the opportunity to
attempt to deny coverage.
As for the question of the insurer's obligation to indemnify the
insured for liability, the compensatory portion of the judgment should
be covered. The problem will arise as to the exemplary damages
portion of the judgment. Depending on how a court characterizes the
conscious disregard and reckless conduct of the defendant, it is
conceivable that the conduct could be considered almost intentional,
thereby possibly excluding it from coverage. 140 However, the defendant
in a treble damage action should be covered for the exemplary
damages, considering that the Obremski II decision specifically held
that these are not punitive damages. 141 This is an issue that will be
considered by the courts in future cases.
driving case involved intoxication, high speed driving, and hit and run on the part
of the insured. The plaintiff, McNulty, who suffered extensive personal injuries, was
awarded $57,700 at trial, of which $20,000 was punitive damages and not covered
by the insurance company.
138. A majority of the courts held that exemplary damages are insurable. K.
REDDEN, PUNITV E DAMAGES § 9.3, at 685 (where the main issues concerning the
insurability of exemplary damages are insurance policy language and public policy
issues). See, e.g., Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383
S.W.2d 1 (1964) (where the policy covered "all sums" for which the insured may
become liable); Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d
522 (1972) (where the policy covered "all sums" for which the insured may become
liable arising out of ownership, maintenance, or use of the car).
139. See, e.g., Aetna Cas, & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of
London, England, 56 Cal. App. 3d 791, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1976) (where the court
found that the duty to defend may be broader than the duty to indemnify).
140. Automobile insurance policies typically contain a liability exclusion for
injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured.
See Comment, The Insurer'sDuty to Defend Under a Liability InsurancePolicy, 114
U. PA. L. REV. 734 (1966).
141. Obremski, 497 N.E.2d at 911.
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CONCLUSION

The Obremski II decision has clarified the basis upon which
intoxicated drivers will be held liable for property damage resulting
from reckless behavior. This case is another step against the notion
that people should not be punished in a monetary fashion for an act
which could subject them to criminal prosecution. The imposition of
liability upon the drunk driver is intended not only to deter people
from drinking and driving, but also to prevent injured victims from
going uncompensated for harm inflicted by drunk drivers. Thus, the
Obremski II decision will likely make drivers consider the potential
costs of returning to the public highways after excessive consumption
of alcohol.
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